

Chapter 9

Citizenship

In political theory, citizenship refers to not only a legal status as a member of a particular country but also a normative ideal—the ruled are full and equal participants in the political process. Citizenship is a distinctively democratic ideal, for people as in a monarchy or a dictatorship is subjects and not citizens. Often democracy and citizenship are indistinguishable, though the former focuses on the institutions and procedures—political parties, electoral systems and the rule of law and constitutional provision that enable citizens' active and full participation. Theories of citizenship focus on the attributes of individual citizens. Citizens have certain rights and duties, which vary from one country to another.

In ancient Athens, citizenship was perceived mainly with reference to duties, while the modern connotation of citizenship involves a set of rights besides duties. In modern times, citizens have a right to participate in politics and also a right to pursue their private commitments, besides their political commitment. In the modern period, citizenship connotes a status defined with reference to a set of particular rights and duties. It is also an identity, indicating one's membership in a political community. This identity is shared in common by different groups in society and thus is integrative in nature. It conveys equal status and equal rights before the law. Expansion of citizenship rights helps to incorporate previously excluded groups, like the working class and women in society. Citizenship signifies membership and the participation of citizens in the collective affairs of their government.

The ancients regarded citizenship a privilege to select a few. For the moderns, the spread of democracy and with it universal suffrage, has made citizenship universal. It signifies common identity as it makes each person proud of the whole nation to which he belongs. However, in both the conceptions, citizenship implies that citizens are equals under the law, even if one is richer or more gifted than other or occupies office for the moment. This democratic notion of citizenship differs from the pre-modern conceptions that determine people's status by their ethnicity, gender, religion or class. Citizens are classified as natural and naturalised citizens. The former are citizens by virtue of birth in a particular place, while the latter acquire citizenship. *Jus soli* and *jus sanguineous* are the two ways of determining citizenship. The crucial

equalitarian impulse of modern citizenship is based on the principle of one person, one vote.

CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE AGES

Citizenship and the City-state

Citizenship was an important theme in ancient Greek and Roman Republics but disappeared from feudal systems, to be revived as the most desirable aspect of civic humanism during the Renaissance. In ancient Athens, citizenship was primarily perceived in terms of participation duties. Citizens were legally required to take their turn in public office. In ancient Athens, citizens actively participated in the institutions of government—assembly, council and courts—and in public debates. The Athenian model is known as active citizenship. A man who had no interest in politics or in the administration of his state was described as an 'idiot'. Pericles praising the Athenian citizen in the Funeral Oration Speech (429 BC), delivered after the first casualties of the long-drawn Peloponnesian Wars (431–404 BC), describes the virtues of citizenship.

Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics—this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say has no business here at all (Thucydides 1954: 118–119).

Citizenship during Pericles' time meant common good and common endeavours among the citizens. The constitution was not a legal document but a way of life, with every Athenian participating with total commitment. In the process, each individual acquired a civic personality and a sense of responsibility. There was general commitment to the idea of civic virtue, for private interests were subordinated to the public welfare and common good. With a civilisation based on slavery and commerce restricted to resident aliens who enjoyed the legal status of free individuals but no citizenship rights, there was not much of a disparity between citizens as what they valued was not affluence but leisure. It was a society of equals with rough parity that enabled them to pursue common goals. Though an ardent democrat, Pericles in 451 BC restricted the franchise to the legitimate offspring(s) of Athenian parents, in order to ensure that the rewards of citizenship were confined to the Athenian middle class.

As in many other areas of political enquiry, Aristotle provides the earliest discussion of citizenship. Citizenship is of pivotal importance to him, as with his practical sense, he easily perceives that ideal governance is possible only by a law-based state, in which citizens abide by laws. This is contrary to Plato's belief structure in the *Republic* wherein he does not consider participation by the

average person as crucial to the process of government and places greater faith on the rule by the philosopher king. This changes in the Laws, for he defends a law-governed state as the best. Aristotle characterises political authority as constitutional between equals and since an individual is a political animal who finds fulfillment only within a *polis*, it is natural for people to aspire for political positions. Constitutional government with respect to citizenship rights allows people to compete for political office without civil chaos. Aristotle defines a state as a collective body of citizens. He rules out citizenship on the basis of residence since resident aliens and slaves also share a common residence with citizens but are not equipped to be citizens. Citizenship does not refer to the share that one has in civic rights, to the extent of being entitled to sue and to be sued in the courts of law, for this right belongs to aliens as well. A citizen is one who enjoys the right to share in the deliberative or judicial offices, is able to exercise his political rights effectively and enjoys constitutional rights under the system of public law.

For Aristotle, a citizen is one who shares power in the polis. He does not, like Plato, distinguish between, 'an active ruling group and a politically passive community' (Wolin 1960: 57). He stipulates that the young and the old could not be citizens for the former is immature and the latter infirm. He does not regard women as citizens since they lack the deliberative faculty and the leisure to understand the working of politics. As far as working class is concerned, though some states had made them citizens, they clearly do not have the aptitude or the leisure to display the true excellence to shoulder civic responsibilities. A good citizen has the intelligence and the ability to rule and to be ruled. He, however, shares with Plato the perception that citizenship is a privilege and a status to be inherited. Aristotle points out that in order to discharge the functions effectively citizens need to inhabit a *polis* that is compact and close-knit. He is critical of Plato's prescription of a citizen body of five thousand as the ideal, for that is too large requiring unlimited space, such as the sprawling lands of Babylon, rendering impossible functions like military command, public communications and judicial judgements. A cohesive citizen body where everybody knows one another intimately, can settle disputes effectively and satisfactorily, and distribute political offices according to the merit of the candidates. The quality of citizenship suffers in a larger political community due to lack of intimacy. This eulogy of the *polis* comes at a time when Alexander, Aristotle's pupil, was already establishing an empire and the city-state was on the throes of extinction.

Aristotle considers a good citizen as someone who could live in harmony with the constitution and has sufficient leisure time to devote himself to the tasks and responsibilities of citizenship. He regards the existence of diversity of interests within a citizen-body, as essential to the practice of citizenship for a good government could be attained only through a balance of these interests. A good citizen would possess virtue or moral goodness that would help in realising a selfless and co-operative civic life. Aristotle regards citizenship

Plato

Aristotle on citizens

as a bond forged by the intimacy of participation in public affairs. The bond is moreover a relationship which is guarded with some jealousy by those privileged to enjoy it. It is neither a right to be claimed by nor a status to be conferred on anybody outside the established ranks of the class, no matter how worthy such an outsider might be. Indeed, Greek citizenship depended not so much on rights, which could be claimed as on responsibilities, which had with pride to be shouldered (Heater 1990: 4).

Rome developed a pragmatic, flexible and legalistic notion of citizenship. Full citizenship carried with it six privileges. Of these, four were public rights, service in the army, voting in the assembly, eligibility to public office and the legal right of action and appeal. The other two pertained to the rights of intermarriage and trade with other Roman citizens. In the fourth century, Rome's basic concept of citizenship underwent three historically significant adaptations. In 381 BC, Rome conferred full citizenship on the male members of the city of Tusculum in the region of Latium. The distinction between 'Latin' and 'Roman' citizenship was also introduced so that a person could simultaneously be a citizen of his own city and of Rome. Five decades later, the inhabitants of the other Latin towns were offered partial citizenship—*civitas sine suffragio* (citizenship without franchise) that allowed enjoyment of private privileges. Roman citizenship was conferred to the inhabitants of the territories that Rome annexed, quite contrary to the practice of the Greeks, who continued to treat the citizens of neighbouring Greek cities as aliens. Roman citizenship provided total equality before the law. Just as in Greece, in Rome too, citizenship meant virtue—the willingness to serve one's state. Service to the state meant military rather than juridical-political. Cicero reiterates the Aristotelian conception of an active and virtuous citizen, as one who uses his gift of speech and rational thought for the benefit of the community and such a person fulfils his nature as a social animal. Rome, reiterating Aristotle, bequeathes to the West the idea of active life of strict republican virtue and participatory citizenship of the economically independent and the belief that empire destroys *virtu*, even civic and political life. The theme of citizenship so prominent and so arduously worked out during Greek and Roman period disappears from medieval thought only to be revived during the Renaissance with the rebirth of republicanism. Rome in course of time with the expansion of its empire, unlike Greece, comes to accept a more inclusive notion. At the height of Rome's imperial power, citizenship becomes a tool of social control and pacification (Faulks 2003: 19).

During the middle ages with the predominance of Christianity, the emphasis was on simplicity and sacrifice. It was essentially other-worldly with little attention on earthly matters. Men were primarily citizens of the whole world or of the city of god. Earthly citizenship was not that important for a good life. Aquinas, however, revives Aristotle's notion of citizenship by reiterating the key distinction of being a good citizen without possessing the qualities of a good man. Though he says very little about constitutional mechanisms and political institutions yet, his resuscitation of Aristotle's concepts of the

state and citizenship has a revolutionary impact on political theory. It becomes possible once again to conceive of a state as an abstract entity with which the individual *qua* citizen has a vital relationship in both senses of the word. It thus becomes possible in theory for the political man to be judged by criteria different from those used in judgement of the Christian soul; and for the active citizen of the state to supersede the passive subject of the prince (Heater 1990: 21). Marsilius severs the connection between the human law and god's natural law, as he regards the state as a self-sufficient entity, which is determined by the citizenry; and that no government is good and stable without the consent of the citizens. He also proposes representation to overcome the difficulties of direct participation by a large body of citizens. The first principles of indirect democracy crystallise under his vision.

Renaissance Republicanism

Machiavelli, for whom the *virtù* of the citizens is the greatest input to Rome's greatness, revives the classical argument of citizenship in the Roman, rather than the Aristotelian sense. Reflecting on the instability and vulnerability of his native city Florence and comparing it with the power and stability that Rome achieved, Machiavelli concludes that the key factor is citizen *virtù*, which means patriotism, self-discipline, simple piety and the willingness to subordinate private gain for public good. He also emphasises on the need for a citizen-army as the quintessence of citizenship, for a citizen, as opposed to a mercenary soldier is reliable enough to sacrifice his life for the unity of his state. Held (1996, 36–39) describes Machiavelli's notion as protective republicanism as he views citizenship as a method for asserting citizens' interest. This is in contrast to Aristotle's developmental republicanism that underlines the performance of citizenship as a core element of what it means to be human. Bodin's concern is with the legal and social dimensions of citizenship, for he states that birth, adoption or enfranchisement can be the basis for acquiring citizenship. He also points to the cohesive quality of citizenship when the whole body of citizens submits to a single sovereign despite the existence of diverse laws, customs, language, religion and race. He rejects the idea of equal citizenship for all as no state ever recognises its citizens to be equal in rights and privileges.

Hobbes and Locke ignore the ideals of classical republicanism and citizen virtue. For both Hobbes and Locke, consent plays a crucial role. However, Locke underlines the importance of continuous consent, in the form of tacit consent and individual rights as the basis of legitimate political authority. Hobbes' model is termed as 'subject-citizenship' because it had as its aim, the securing of order rather than the performance of civic virtue, or the protection of individual rights (Faulks 2003, 22). Rousseau resurrects the ideals of public spirit, simplicity of life and desire for self-government of ancient Athens and Sparta and incorporates it with the modern notion of voluntarism and consent. Modern citizenship's stress on universality and equality is derived from

Stoicism which asserts the moral equality of human beings. Another important input is the universalistic tradition of Roman natural law (ibid: 15). Modern citizenship unlike ancient notion is not exclusive; the primary difference between pre-modern and modern citizenship is the acceptance of inequality of status unquestioningly. ✓

MARSHALL'S ANALYSIS

Marshall, a liberal-social democrat representing the post-Second World War Keynesian consensus, links citizenship to social class in the context of the rise of capitalism and its most important by-product, the market. His formulation is similar to the Marxist critique of inequality, deprivation and polarisation of classes that inevitably follows the institutionalisation of a market economy. However, what differentiates his analysis from the Marxist analysis is his assertion that citizenship, which is based on the principle of equality, blunts many of the sharp edges that the market induces that are based on inequality. The class structure gets significantly modified with the advancements of citizenship. The process of modification in the capitalistic market does not mean abolition of classes. The class structure remains but the rise of citizenship minimises its disadvantages. Marshall's essential example is the post-Second World War evolution of the welfare state in Britain. It is within this context that he examines the development of capitalism and the consequent social system and the class structure. Market relationship and citizenship are antagonistic because citizenship accepts that every individual is entitled to the full membership of the community enjoying equal rights and duties, whereas market inevitably leads to wide differentiation in status, power and attitude. Marshall's emphasis on the British experience follows from his understanding that there are no universal principles determining the rights and duties of citizenship, for these evolve in a specific context.

According to Marshall, citizenship has three essential divisions—civil, political and social. The civil component consists of rights necessary for individual freedom and in this the most essential ingredient is the rule of law and the legal system. The political basis of citizenship is reflected in the right to participate in the political decision-making process. The realisation of such rights is associated with representative parliamentary institutions. The social basis of citizenship accrues out of a right or the capacity to enjoy the fruits of prevailing standard of living and thereby providing the larger societal basis of community. Here Marshall's emphasis is on the social services and the educational system. In the British context, these different dimensions of citizenship evolved gradually in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, he is careful to mention that these broad periods are not watertight compartments since these different components overlap. The important argument is that the different components of citizenship require different institutional supports and emerge at different historical periods.

In the feudal setup, the source of citizenship is the restricted basis of a society full of cleavages and visible hierarchies. Subsequently, the nature of citizenship changes with conflict between different social institutions and also social groups. The relationship and the interplay between citizenship and social class is Marshall's most important contribution to the theory of citizenship and here, in the British context, he notes the coincidence of the rise of modern citizenship with the rise of capitalism. Since the basis of citizenship is very different from the capitalistic ethos, it is 'reasonable to expect that the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of conflict between opposing principles' (Marshall 1950: 84). What is striking is that the opposite evolution takes place without being contradictory and mutually exclusive. It is accepted that, in the initial phase of the development of capitalism, citizenship undermines the privileges of the feudal elite while consolidating the capitalist class relations and divisions based on commodity production and exchange. Modern citizenship evolves out of a limited formal basis of legal equality doing away with the feudal societal setup permitting the actualisation of a new class system with the institution of private property. Paradoxically, citizenship initially does away with a particular class system and promotes another. However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, citizenship rights co-existed harmoniously with the inequalities of the capitalistic system as these rights are the basic requirements to maintain a particular kind of inequality. During this period, citizenship rights are exclusively civil rights, which is the basic requirement of a competitive market economy. For entering the market, both the capitalist and the workers have the same perception of civil rights. To enter into the market for exchange and contracts with each other, Marshall argues that, if such rights are the basis of citizenship, then inevitably citizenship strengthens and stratifies class inequalities. However, when citizenship incorporates political and social rights as well, then the conflict with the unequal class system actualised by civil rights leads to a situation of conflict. However, the danger to the capitalist class by the working class after gaining political power does not materialise mainly because of its inexperience to effectively use political power for its benefit in the nineteenth century. So the potential of the reform acts to create a more egalitarian society remains unfulfilled. This inadequacy, however, is largely met by the creation of trade unions as 'a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel with and supplementary to the system of political citizenship' (1950: 94).

The novel method of collective bargaining, which trade unionism facilitates, leads to the enhancement of the economic and social status of the organised workers. Trade unionism has established the claim of social rights of the workers. This incorporation of social rights in the charter of citizenship leads Marshall to comment that 'citizenship and the capitalist class system are at war' (1950: 84). In situations of fundamental shifts like the Second World War, social citizenship does not destroy class nor does it eliminate class inequality but leads to new inequalities. What social citizenship achieves is to reduce

the number of social inequalities that are an inevitable outcome of market operations. Citizenship performs an integrative function, as by promoting equality of status of each individual it combats the disruptive inequalities of a market economy. Equality of citizenship allows the acceptance of economic inequalities. Marshall agrees that even if citizenship can really overcome market inequality totally, tension will always persist and integration will remain incomplete. However, this act of integration is not only a situation of equalising rights for all but also a feeling of actual membership of the community. It is a common possession of a civilisation with sharing of national and societal values. This realisation, impossible in a feudal set up with total stratification, is now possible because of acquisition of civil rights by all the citizens and, as a result, different and visible cultures of various classes have disappeared. A common citizenship bond creates a new national identity and consciousness. This common civilisation has a material base as mass production for the home market and a growing interest on the part of industry in the needs and tastes of the common people enables the less well-to-do to enjoy a material civilisation which differs less markedly in quality from that of the rich than it has ever done before. All this profoundly alters the setting in which the progress of citizenship takes place. Social integration spreads from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment. The components of a civilised and cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few, are brought progressively within the reach of the many (1950: 96).

Mass production in the twentieth century, brought by Fordism¹ has enabled an overall improvement in the standard of living for everybody. This Marshall calls 'concrete substance of civilised life' (1950: 102) for it reduces risk and insecurity and perhaps more importantly equalises the entire societal pattern of behaviour. Real satisfaction and money income gets increasingly distant as mass production is actualised with the destruction of distinctive and divisive class cultures by the realisation of civil rights. This assertion of Marshall in *Citizenship and Social Class* reiterates his stance in his earlier book, *Work and Wealth* (1945).

There has been going on, especially in the last fifty years or so, a steady fusion of class civilisations into a single national civilisation. ... There was a time when the culture of each class was, as it were, unique species. ... Mass production destroyed this isolation. ... There has been a progressive equalisation of the quality of material culture so that, even though great differences remain between the top and the bottom, they are variations on a single theme and are linked in a continuous scale. ... (Among other things it follows that) as higher quality goods move down the social scale, so hands reach up towards them from below and voices are lifted demanding a speedier rise in the standard of living (1945: 216-17).

This common material civilisation promotes social integration by percolation of economic well-being to lower classes within a uniform pattern and standard. Integration is achieved more by economic well-being rather than

the number of social inequalities that are an inevitable outcome of market operations. Citizenship performs an integrative function, as by promoting equality of status of each individual it combats the disruptive inequalities of a market economy. Equality of citizenship allows the acceptance of economic inequalities. Marshall agrees that even if citizenship can really overcome market inequality totally, tension will always persist and integration will remain incomplete. However, this act of integration is not only a situation of equalising rights for all but also a feeling of actual membership of the community. It is a common possession of a civilisation with sharing of national and societal values. This realisation, impossible in a feudal set up with total stratification, is now possible because of acquisition of civil rights by all the citizens and, as a result, different and visible cultures of various classes have disappeared. A common citizenship bond creates a new national identity and consciousness. This common civilisation has a material base as mass production for the home market and a growing interest on the part of industry in the needs and tastes of the common people enables the less well-to-do to enjoy a material civilisation which differs less markedly in quality from that of the rich than it has ever done before. All this profoundly alters the setting in which the progress of citizenship takes place. Social integration spreads from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment. The components of a civilised and cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few, are brought progressively within the reach of the many (1950: 96).

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by political citizenship. Marshall's theory of integration has three distinctive parts—first, civil rights creates a citizenship in which distinct and particularistic class cultures decline, as graphically described by Shaw in *Pygmalion*, immortalised and popularised by its theatrical and cinematic versions called *My Fair Lady*, second, social rights drastically reduce class inequalities, with the majority of people identifying themselves as middle class and third, mass production provides the basis of a common material civilisation, which in turn develops into an integrative citizenship. However, in spite of these integrative tendencies the conflict and contradiction between the egalitarian impulse of citizenship and the in-egalitarian thrust of the market is a continuous process and therefore there is no final resolution of them. In this perennial conflict, class inequalities are blunted only by the egalitarianism that is created by a material culture and a common civilisation. However, since the very basis of this social equilibrium does not have a consensual basis the endemic conflict between citizenship and social class will continue forever. Social integration is never final and as such, integration will always remain problematic, as the basic contradiction between citizenship rights and the market forces can never be done away with. The historical specificity of the British Welfare state resting on the Beveridge Report and the National Service arises under certain specific social and economic conditions, which emerges out of the war years. However, the subsequent rise of an affluent society and inflation, in the 1990s creates a different situation which is less conducive to the welfare state. Like civil rights, social movements are also important in Marshall's account of citizenship. Civil rights create groups, associations and movements of a wide variety and in the situation of a conspicuous absence of civil rights; social movements can be a source of power capacitating a group for effective action. Marshall's examples are the Black power movement in the United States and the Student Movement of the 1960s. As such, social movements play a dual role as contributing and facilitating citizenship.

CRITICS OF MARSHALL

Many commentators have made important criticisms of Marshall's theory of citizenship. Dahrendorf (1959) finds it as slightly odd that though Marshall mentions industrial rights and counts it in the development of citizenship yet he does not include it as one of the basic essential ingredients of citizenship along with civil, political and social rights. Dahrendorf also finds Marshall's emphasis on the egalitarian impulse of social citizenship irrelevant for comprehending the problem of class as it exclusively deals with social stratification and completely ignores the economic function of wealth and personal property. Marshall claims that citizenship reduces class conflict but does not answer the question of the basis and source of tension and conflict. He also does not provide an account of the dynamics of class and distributional relationship and because of this limitation, his conception of citizenship is fundamentally weak.

Turner (1986: 64) questions Marshall's entire developmental logic and asserts that there is 'no necessary historical logic or upholding process'. The development is more contingent than following a regular pattern. Turner, reiterated by Barbalet (1977), asserts that the extension of citizenship rights takes place when groups, which are previously excluded, specially the working class, get accommodated. Turner observes that 'Marshall can be interpreted as saying that social violence has the potential for expanding the universalistic definition of the citizen', but Marshall fails 'to emphasise that citizenship rights have been achieved in substantial degree only through struggle' (1982: 171). Turner's position has more support amongst sociologists. Lipset (1963: xx) categorically states that Marshall, 'kept alive the perspective that society requires conflict'.

Turner finds that Marshall's overemphasis and preoccupation with class leads to the neglect of other important factors of modern social change, mainly war and migration, a criticism which Gallie (1983: 225-227) rejects and points out that Marshall insists on the importance of class conflict in order to understand how the state tries to manipulate popular sentiment by the extension of citizenship rights. Turner emphasises the role of egalitarian ideologies, along with migration, as wielding crucial influence on moulding modern democratic citizenship. Migration from traditional rural cultures leads to secularisation of society, which intensifies the struggle for citizenship rights. The evolution of citizenship in essentially migrant nations like America, Australia, Canada and New Zealand has to be understood in view of the nature of this mass migration and its effects. Barbalet (1997: 41-42) contends that 'it is misleading to assume that migration will continue to play a positive role in the development of democratic citizenship without regard to the class context in which it operates'. Turner is critical of Marshall for accepting the present British nation-state. He mentions four waves of modern citizenship as an alternative to the historical evolution that Marshall suggests. These are (a) consequences of the removal of property connotation from definition of citizenship, (b) removal of sex as a category, (c) redistribution of age, kinship and family for citizenship rights and (d) expansion of citizenship rights by including nature and environment. Barbalet (ibid: 102) points out that though Turner's framework is refreshing and novel its 'role in understanding the development of citizenship is not clear and somewhat limited'. Moreover, as a guide to historical evolution it 'fails to adequately reflect the history of social movements'. Nor can this scheme 'replace nor usefully supplement Marshall's distinction between civil, political and social rights in the development of citizenship' (Barbalet, ibid). Miller (2000: 44) observes that 'Marshall's view runs into difficulties, once the idea of a common civilisation is challenged by the emergence of radical cultural pluralism. If there is no longer a shared "common heritage" or "way of life" by reference to which citizens' rights have been defined, how are we to arrive at the conception of social justice that defines citizenship?'

Giddens' alternative theory of citizenship begins by rejecting Marshall's theory. He is critical of Marshall's theory of industrial rights, which for him means forming trade unions, collective bargaining and right to strike. Giddens argues that rights are distinguishable by class bias. For instance, the rights of personal freedom and equality have been fought and won by the emerging capitalist class opposing feudal privileges for these hindered trade and commerce. From the point of the bourgeoisie, these rights imply strengthening of their control over the employees and other factors of production. As such, the struggle to form trade unions and the right to strike are not merely extension of civil liberties but a reflection of the working class movement against the employers and the state. Giddens claims that industrial rights can form a part of civil rights as Marshall acknowledges them to be. However, even his argument is inadequate as contrary to his separate categorisation one must not forget that civil and political liberties have been won, as pointed out by Miliband after centuries of struggle and as a precondition to the enjoyment of industrial rights that form a part of the latter rights. Giddens (1982: 171) also says that what Marshall claims to be conflict or struggles are actually contradictions and that 'extension of citizenship rights in Britain as in other societies, is in substantial degree the result of the efforts of the underprivileged to improve their lot'. Barbalet observes that Giddens' basic criticism of Marshall's three-stage theory of citizenship development in Britain flows from a basic error of confusing between power and rights. He says 'political citizenship, being rights of political participation without limitation by economic status, could only be added to the general status of citizenship when a class emerged in the social structure which was prepared and able to fight for such rights. This of course is Giddens' more general point, but it too requires qualification' (1997: 34).

Giddens acknowledges the importance of Marshall's analysis of citizenship but makes a number of critical remarks and provides a transformative criticism of his entire thesis. The historical account of Marshall is not acceptable to Giddens. The teleological and evolutionary theory of Marshall is based on a flawed logic of modern historical process. The three-fold classification is a gross overstatement and that Marshall simplifies the role of politics and the state in his theory. He acknowledges the support and approval of the state in consolidating citizenship but ignores the struggle of the people in achieving it. Moreover, Marshall ignores the unequal exchange between the privileged and the underprivileged in which the favourable balance for the latter was limited and rare, reflected only during the times of war, mainly the world wars. Halsey (1984: 11) says, 'Giddens' criticism cannot be fully sustained' because Marshall points out that class and citizenship and social forces 'at war in the twentieth century'. The basis of this conflict 'springs from the very roots of our social order'. As such, even amongst the critics there is no unanimity about Marshall's basic formulations.

Held (1989) considers all these criticisms as misleading for a number of reasons. There is very little evidence to prove that Marshall's contention is

based on a logic that is teleological and evolutionary, for he is aware of the role of institutions and is conscious of the complexities in determining the speed of the movement of citizenship. There is no linear movement and Marshall is conscious of the ups and downs of this struggle, which is a struggle in the feudal state against hierarchy, and inequality that inevitably characterises a market state. This struggle has various phases, phases to fight for and the phases to protect and broaden it. The entire process reflects a fine balance between social and market forces. The intensity of the struggle is reflected by his description of a war situation between citizenship and class. His theory is based on the assumption of severe conflict, which Giddens ignores. Giddens also charges Marshall for conceiving citizenship as one-way traffic or a process that can be reversed. However, this criticism does not stand a close scrutiny of Marshall's work. He mentions the prevalence of primitive social rights, preceding the eighteenth century, and their disappearance in the latter half of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century Britain. Their reappearance begins with the spread of public elementary education but the subsequent development is heavily dependent on the relative strength or weakness of the various social movements supporting reform. A modern national consciousness accelerates for citizenship based on equal social worth of every single individual. A sense of community develops leading towards a feeling of oneness and rough parity. The international situation does not play an important part in his theory but it is equally true that he is conscious of nationalism and war in realising social rights. Even the present balance between class and citizenship does not mean that this equilibrium will continue into the foreseeable future as well. He even concedes that the durability of this balance is very difficult to determine. With regard to the factors that led to the actualisation of rights, Giddens thinks that though Marshall does not place due emphasis on conflict, the fact remains that conflict plays a very important role in his means of actualising rights.

Giddens' own model begins with the consolidation and expansion of state sovereignty and development of administrative power in the late sixteenth century. It begins with the capacity of the state to collect information about members of society and to supervise and create a governmental apparatus of surveillance. With the expansion of state's sovereign powers, the administrative centres become more powerful and the capacity of the state to enforce its writ by force got progressively reduced. A cooperative form of social relationship becomes increasingly necessary, which leads to a greater reciprocity between the governor and the governed and as this reciprocity increased the capacity of the subordinate groups to influence their rulers also increases. This double path expansion of power for Giddens was 'the dialectic of control' (Giddens 1985: 201).

The entire struggle for rights has to be analysed in this perspective. The identity of the subject population blossoms under the expanding sphere of state sovereignty. 'The expansion of state sovereignty means that those subject to

it as in some sense—initially vague, but growing more and more definite and precise—aware of their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers' (Giddens 1985: 210). Nationalism also grows under similar circumstances. The administrative unity of the state is closely associated with nationalism and the mediation of this process is provided by citizenship. In this struggle for equal citizenship rights, there are many factors but the most important is class conflict, which at first takes the shape of the bourgeoisie against the feudal privileges, and subsequently the working class against the bourgeoisie. These struggles lead to important changes, first the delinking of the state from the economy, which is a consequence of the institutionalisation of civil and political rights. This enables the civil society to be free from the state's political interference. The institutions of the state and the economy gets remoulded with the separation of state from the economy creating new sets of rights and privileges which should not be seen as being created 'outside' the sphere of the state, but as part and parcel of the emergence of the 'public domain', separated from 'privately' organised economic activity. Civil rights thus have been, from the early phases of capitalist development, bound up with the very definition of what counts as 'political'. Civil and political citizenship rights develop together and remain, thereafter, open to a range of divergent interpretations which may directly affect the distribution of power (Giddens 1985: 207).

The rule by many or polyarchy develops in this background. The public-private divide also arises in this setting. Another historic change occurs after the right to vote is granted to gain 'social rights' or 'economic rights'. The struggle has been a long-drawn one for these rights ultimately led to the emergence of the welfare state. Giddens argues that the economic rights are not an extension of civil and political rights as they try to formalise the workers' control of the workplace. The entire extension of the ambit of citizenship is primarily due to class conflict. However, the achievements of the working class are still fragile and erosion is still possible in various political and economic situations. His conclusion is substantially similar to Marshall's formulations.

Held finds a number of weaknesses in Giddens' formulation, which emerges from his endorsement of many of Marshall's basic premises and due to lack of precision. 'The upshot of these problems is a fundamental underestimation of the complexity of citizenship: its multidimensional roots and the way the struggle for different types of rights is inscribed into, or embedded in, changing conception of citizenship' (Held 1989: 198). Giddens is critical of Marshall from a Marxist point of view, but also uses Marshall's arguments to criticise Marx. Giddens thinks that Marx is correct in ascribing many new rights as 'bourgeois freedom'. However, by using Marshall against Marx, he points to Marx's failure to take note of and see the possibility of actualisation of certain important citizenship rights to be realised within the ambit of liberal capitalism. Among the industrialised societies, at least, capitalism is by now a very different phenomenon from what it was in the nineteenth century and labour

movements have played a prime role in changing it. In most capitalist countries, we now have to speak of the existence of 'welfare capitalism', a system in which the labour movement has achieved a considerable stake and in which economic (social) citizenship rights brook large (Giddens 1985: 325).

However, as Macpherson (1966) points out, freedom of choice is the key to the basis of the individual as a citizen and this choice can be regarding religion, marriage, economic and political issues. Following Macpherson, Held (1989: 206) argues that Giddens', 'terms of reference are narrowly conceived' and do not permit the adequate specification of the diverse range of rights that emerge with the development of modern citizenship. He goes on to argue that a plausible theory of rights, taking note of the various range of rights which were a pre-requisite in creating the modern world, 'will require an analysis which goes far beyond that provided by Marx, Marshall and Giddens' (Held 1989: 206).

COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP

While Aristotle defines citizenship with reference to the city-state, a contemporary school, the Stoics put forward the notion of **cosmopolitan citizenship**. Despite Socrates drinking the hemlock without hesitation to prove his duty to obey the laws of his city, Athens, he speaks of allegiance to large humankind. It is in the fifth century BC Greece that the idea of cosmopolis or universal state emerges. Democritus (460–370 BC) and most **Sophists**, in general, and **Antiphon**, in particular, supported the idea. Antiphon was perhaps the first to speak of the existence of a universal law above local laws. Diogenes (d 324 BC), the Cynic, takes up the idea of cosmopolis or the 'city of the universe' as the community of the wise, the real community of human beings who pursue wisdom through reason. This community knows no geographical boundaries nor is it committed to any man made laws or constitutions. In the fourth century BC, the Cyrenaics, predecessors to Epicureans, defended cosmopolitanism as opposed to the city-state culture. The idea of world citizenship came into vogue and 'the ideal of Greek citizenship associated with the city-state was under question. At the same time, the city-state as an autonomous institution was itself being undermined in practice' (Heater 1990: 9). Ironically, Alexander, pupil of Aristotle, advocated positive and creative cosmopolitan notion of citizenship than Diogenes. He did away with the distinction between Greek and barbarian and "did not, as Aristotle advised him, treat the Greeks in the spirit of a leader and the barbarians in that of a master... rather he believed that he had a mission from God to be the reconciler of the world. ... He wished to show that all things on earth were subject to one principle and included in one polity, and that all men were one people; and he demeaned himself accordingly. If the power that sent the world the soul of Alexander had not quickly recalled it, one law would have governed all men, and they would have turned their gaze to one system of justice as though to a common light' (Plutarch cited in Heater, *ibid*: 9–10).

Zeno (334/33–262/61 BC) of the Stoic school is another exponent of cosmopolitanism. Stoicism stresses on the rationality of men, and being children of god, because of this common attribute of reason, all men, of whatever race or social status, slave or free, equal resonates subsequently, in St. Paul's conception of the universal Church. Echoing Diogenes', the Stoics too believe wisdom to be an essential qualification for citizenship and point out that all men, world over and without distinction, are capable of attaining this status by developing their rational faculties. A citizen of the world will obey the 'law of nature', a code consisting of fundamental principles of justice derived from divine reason, and comprehended by man through the exercise of his reason. In case there is a clash between local, man-made laws with that of the law of nature, the laws of the world-city would prevail over those of the city-state. Two aspects of Stoicism exerts in-depth, perhaps lasting influence—one, the sacred relationship between god and man, absorbed by Christianity and the other, the conflation of law and nature, that subsequently becomes the basis of the doctrine of natural law. Cicero transmits the basic Stoic idea of human equality and brotherhood underpinning universal law of nature to Seneca, who writing a century later, believes that good life pursued in the interests of humanity at large is different and higher from the low life of the citizen in a state. During Seneca's time, the tussle between the two loyalties, the Christian loyalty to their 'heavenly kingdom' and the loyalty to the Emperor surfaced. The dilemma was that of men being loyal not only to mankind in general but to a spiritual belief and to the Roman Emperor. By the end of the first century, Marcus Aurelius became sensitive to this dilemma which eased off with Rome embracing Christianity and Christianity accepting Roman Stoicism. The Stoic universal city of men and gods metamorphoses into the Christian City of God and the fundamental tension remains. However, the Christian adapts the concept of cosmopolis and renders it mystical detaching it from earthly reality. The City of God would be attained only in heaven, or on earth, possibly, with the Second Coming. During the Middle Ages, Christian teaching dominates and the cosmopolitan ideas of Cynics and Stoics go into background. In the non-Western tradition, Confucius emphasised on the concept of *ta t'ung*, the greater unity and called for the restoration of the world commonwealth in which everyone worked for general welfare and harmony. A similar view existed in India too, which considered it petty to understand a person sans his humanity as exemplified in the popular phrase, *Vasudeva*

Kutumbakum.

In the Middle Ages, the ideal of human unity on earth remains alive in the writings of Ockham and Dante. The latter argues for a global monarch as the ultimate source of authority in a world confederation of states and cities believing as he did in the full exercise of human reason, an idea that Kant subsequently borrows, and in existence of hierarchies in the nature of pyramid with the universal monarch at the top. Dante spoke of world government but not world citizenship as there was any individual participation.

In the seventeenth century, there is considerable thinking about the nature of international society and international law and thinkers of this period grapple with the universalist, natural law and Christian assumptions of the Middle Ages on the one hand, and with the emerging consolidated authority of the sovereign state on the other hand. Along with the consolidation of European state system, the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship gets consolidated in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Westphalia accepts the principle of sovereignty and that each state as a self sufficient entity is the basis of international law and behaviour.

In the eighteenth century, the two revolutions—the American and the French—saw the consolidation of constitutional state and along with it the notion of popular sovereignty. The thinkers of the French Enlightenment's belief in human reason led them to believe that national, racial or religious distinctions as basically superficial. There was also a realisation that states inevitably led to oppression and war rather than human freedom and peace. Paine rejects the regimes of the eighteenth century and supports the ideal of world citizenship. Schiller too felt that he was the citizen of the world. Similar sentiments were expressed by Franklin, Beccaria, Priestly, Diderot and Condorcet. Franklin insisted on recognising 'Common Rights of Mankind, hundred years before the UDHR.

Cosmopolitan citizenship receives a fillip in the notion of Cosmopolitan Law formulated by Kant wherein he argues that man's rational nature will ultimately triumph over the agonies of struggle and violence and enable him to draft and obey an overarching world or cosmopolitan law which will ensure peace. He foresees the evolution of a loose confederation of states as the end-product of historical evolution. A citizen obeys the local law of his state but at the same time, in due course, also obeys the co regarded as citizen of cosmopolitan law, convinced that if citizens participate in the making of laws in his state then it is possible to reach the end. He accepts that the process would be slow. The conflict between the local law and the cosmopolitan law will ultimately cease and citizenship would acquire a universal status: 'the individuals who compose the state whose constitution is formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law ... may be regarded as citizens of one world-state' ... the highest purpose of Nature will be at last realised in the establishment of a universal Cosmo-political Institution, in the bosom of which all the original capacities and endowments of the human species will be unfolded and developed' (cited in Linklater 1982: 115). Kant does not however advocate world government. Like most of the thinkers of the eighteenth century, he too suspects concentration of powers in one authority and believes in the beneficence of individual human reason and wisdom. These two ideas are clearly manifest in Bentham who was 'personally the complete cosmopolitan in his outlook' (Heater 1990: 55). Believing as he does in the efficacy of public opinion, he is confident that international contacts on a personal level, rather than between governments, would result in a happier world.

The period between 1899 and 1914 saw a number of peace initiatives, primarily to reduce the power of arms manufacturers and the tendency on part of governments to go to war. In 1910, William James pleaded for substituting warlike tendencies with creative social ones and defended this as a new civic duty related to the global community. During the inter-war years, the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact tried to restrain the absolute right of the state to wage war. H.G. Wells popularises the idea of world citizenship and calls upon the saner and abler persons of the world to establish a new World Order based on broadly socialist principles. He is however unclear about the structure of this new order except reposing faith in global-functional administration rather than world government. Angell is convinced of the usefulness of political wars once European community becomes interdependent due to economic reasons.

In more recent times, Held argues for cosmopolitan ideal for realising world peace and universal equality of individuals, but concedes that these cannot be achieved by relying on the democratic capacities of states alone. He pleads for internationalising democratic law if it has to be effective. Other than respecting reciprocal sovereignty between states, there is a need to agree on commonly shared norms to which states subscribe and institutionalising these principles through the establishment of inter-governmental organisations. For Held and Archibugi (1998), cosmopolitan ideal moves beyond the ethical parameters and emphasises the institutional aspects. Falk (1995) considers national citizenship to be exclusive and divisive; it legitimates unequal protection of rights and is responsible for the unequal distribution of global wealth. He pleads for the co-existence of national and global citizenship. Miller rejects the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship and points out that international peace, international justice and global environmental protection are important objectives but these 'cannot be achieved by inventing in theory cosmopolitan forms of citizenship which undercut the basis of citizenship proper' (Miller 2000: 96)

IDEOLOGIES AND CITIZENSHIP

Liberalism's emphasis is on the importance of the citizen's ability to engage in public discussion believing that good policy emerges out of filtering of such articulations. This does not merely mean an articulation of their point of view but also provides reasons for their political demands in a reasonable manner, avoiding threats as far as possible. These reasons must be of general interest and not sectarian or divisive, in the sense that others from different faiths and nationalities could empathise with them. It is not enough to rely on tradition or scripture but a conscious effort has to be made to distance merely from those beliefs that are private, different from those that can be publicly defended. Liberals, point to the socialisation process in schools that teach the young to understand others' standpoint besides their own cultural traditions. This viewpoint has been questioned by some traditionalists, who fear that

liberal pluralistic education will undermine parental and religious authority in the private life. Some religious groups object to liberal education as an act of intolerance, even if it is carried out in the name of teaching the virtue of tolerance. Besides rationality, liberalism also emphasises universality, meaning equal rights for all before the law. Rights are important as they protect the individual from the growing power of the state. **Civic republicanism** supports active, responsible and virtuous citizenship by subordinating private concerns and interests to public good. It accepts the liberal conception of citizenship as a set of rights and adds to it the fact that a citizen is one who identifies with the political community to which he belongs, and is committed to promoting the common good through active participation in its political life. The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not that the liberal recognises the value of entrenched rights whereas the republican does not, but that the liberal regards these rights as having a pre-political justification while the republican grounds them in public discussion. One institutional corollary is that liberals seek to make the judiciary the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights—in effect the interpretation of liberal citizenship is entrusted to them—while the republican gives this role to the citizen body as a whole (Miller 2000: 59–60). It differs from Aristotle and Arendt for whom political participation is intrinsically worthwhile, being the supreme and highest kind of activity. For Aristotle, this means the political life in a state is superior to private pleasures of the family and profession. For Arendt, this signifies the importance of the political, devoid of social and economic issues.

Burke reinforces the conservative desire to limit citizenship to a segment of adults with property, for they have the leisure for discussion and information. It is in Aristotle's writings that we find the notion of citizens as a leisurely class, men of property, who have the time to discuss the affairs of the state and participate in the formulations of law and policy of his state. This sentiment is best captured by Pericles. Burke considers the rule by the enlightened and aristocratic elite as the best, for the masses are not only incapable of governing themselves but can neither think nor act without guidance. For Burke, government is based not on general will but wisdom that has passed on from one generation to another. He desires representation of the interests and not as we believe in the representation of the people, for they are an objective, impersonal and unattached reality (Pitkin 1967: 10). He advocates restricted suffrage, so that the selection of the natural aristocratic group of parliament becomes foolproof. He distinguishes between actual representation and virtual representation. The latter is based on common interest and since an area will have one dominant interest virtual representation is preferred to actual representation. This also ensures that even those who did not vote are represented. Pitkin (1967: 169–170) points out that this is essentially a seventeenth century notion of representation with little relevance to the contemporary times. Conservatism fears democratic despotism or the tyranny of the majority the most, while considering issues involving representative democracy. Burke is disturbed by the democratic aspirations of

the French Revolution and in particular, by the doctrines of popular sovereignty and general will. He blames the democratic forces of the Revolution for the vast increase in government bureaucracy. He is generally skeptical about the political ability of the ordinary people and regards democracy as the 'most shameless thing in the world' (Pitkin 1967: 190). The New Right and Neo liberals reject social citizenship¹ and emphasise on self-reliance and criticise the welfare state as promoting passivity and dependence among the poor. To promote active citizenship, they want reduction in welfare entitlements and therefore, stress the importance of responsibility to earn a living, which is seen as the key to self-respect and social acceptance. Their critics point out that withdrawal or reduction of welfare benefits further marginalises the underclass. Marxism observes that the idea of equal citizenship rights in a class divided society is a sham, for it is always the interests, privileges, rights and powers of the dominant economic class that are protected. It is part of the bourgeois legal ideology of individualism. For Marx, political emancipation through citizenship becomes meaningful with human emancipation. Conversely, only in a classless society, with collective ownership of the means of production and with the end of oppression, citizenship can transcend class distinctions and class divisions. Even here there is certain ambivalence. Since the socialist society embodies the idea of proletarian internationalism, there is no question of considering citizenship, which refers, in particular, to the nation state. However, the liberating vision of the society after the revolution remains incomplete, for the Marxists emphasise on economic freedom but not political freedom, a society of autonomous and materially satisfied social beings but not a polity of citizens. As a result, they ignore the complex question of institutions that actualise political freedom and citizen participation.

Feminism contends that the emphasis on self-reliance is based on the view that men should financially support the family, while the women would look after the household and care for the young, old and the sick and the elderly. This disallows women's full participation in the society. Since Wollstonecraft feminism has been concerned with how women can be treated as equal citizens along with men. Liberal feminism stresses on equal rights and equal access but ignores human interdependence that is integral to both families and polities. Marxist/socialist feminism accepts the idea of equal rights and equal access but stresses more on the need to transcend class societies through revolutionary struggle, thus, subordinating the women's question to realisation of socialism. Some recent feminists like Elshtain, whom Dietz (1985) labels as maternal feminists, draw attention to the conception of female political consciousness that is grounded in the virtues of woman in the private sphere, primarily, in mothering. They claim the need and importance to perceive women as mothers and not merely as 'reproducers'. Furthermore, while for the liberals and Marxists, men and women are the same and hence deserving equal treatment, postmodernist feminists, like Young, emphasise on the differences that separated men from women and the way these differences ought to be reconciled with

claims of justice and equality. Young argues that the liberals and republicans are committed to an ideal of impartiality and reason, which acts to the disadvantage of certain groups in society and she identified the women and ethnic minorities as oppressed categories. She claims that the ideal of the civic public excludes women and other groups defined as different, because its rational and universal status derived only from its opposition to affectivity, particularity and the body. Republican theorists insisted on the unity of the civic public: insofar as he is a citizen, every man leaves behind his particularity and difference, to adopt a universal standpoint identical for all citizens, the standpoint of the common good or general will. In practice, republican politicians enforced homogeneity by excluding from citizenship all those defined as different and associated with the body, desire or need influence that might veer citizens say from the standpoint of pure reason (1990: 117).

Furthermore, Young argues that the republican ideal adheres to the private-public dichotomy, which discriminates against those whose concerns are conventionally perceived as, essentially, private ones. Though there is no *a priori* way of demarcating the private from the public but nevertheless, the distinction can be upheld between a person acting in a private capacity and as a citizen. Moreover, the divide will emerge in the course of public discussion for certain matters will be inevitably relegated to the private sphere. For instance, it may be difficult to obtain a consensus on an issue so the fairest way is to allow citizens to pursue their own preferences voluntarily, or it may be considered illegitimate for the state to interfere in a citizen's private life. Young ignores the fact that a distinction between private and public will always be maintained though some groups will differ on the issue, but that does not suggest that these groups will automatically lose out.

Lloyd in her *The Man of Reason* (1984) illustrates how concepts in liberal theory are constructed in masculine terms with the idea of citizen, identified with military service, which is still a male preserve. 'The masculinity of war is what it is precisely by leaving the feminine behind. It consists in the capacity to rise above what femaleness symbolically represents: attachment to private concerns, to "mere life". In leaving all that behind, the soldier becomes a real man, but he also emerges into the glories of selfhood, citizenship and truly ethical, universal concerns. Womankind is constructed so as to be what has to be transcended to be a citizen' (1984: 75). The liberal theory of universal citizenship is rooted in the public sphere permeated with the male gender values and women confined to the private domestic sphere do not qualify as citizen (Saxonhouse 1985, Phillips 1993).

Elshtain (1981) and Ruddick (1983) propose a **maternalist conception of citizenship** which is informal, particularist and communitarian as against the individualist, rights-based notion of citizenship that liberals propose. It draws substantially on an ethic of care and prioritises, like the communitarians, the community not only of shared final ends but also as Sandel (1996) calls a common vocabulary of discourse, as the basis of politics. Maternal citizenship

is based on the values of the private sphere, emotional rather than rational, the recognition of difference rather than the aspiration to equality.

Dietz criticises the maternal feminists for ignoring the fact that citizenship involves virtues, relations and practices that are expressly political and more specifically, participatory and democratic. As long as feminists focus exclusively on social and economic questions relating to children, family, schools, work, wages, abortion, abuse, pornography, they do not articulate a political vision or address the problem of citizenship. It is only when they will emphasise on the intrinsic value of citizenship, rather than undertake active citizenship for the pursuit of social and economic concerns, that feminists can hope to achieve a truly distinctive politics of their own. This means considering citizenship as a continuous activity and good in itself. Dietz also argues against universalism and abstractions for these are at variance with the notion of citizenship as a relationship between equals. She points out that citizenship is about getting beyond one's immediate sphere and dealing as a citizen with other citizens, thus, emphasising on universalism and abstraction, of which Young is so suspicious. Dietz correctly warns against 'womanism' and points that a truly democratic defense of citizenship could not proceed from the assumption of woman's traditional neglect or superiority, for that suggests that one group is better or deserves more attention. Furthermore, a point that Dietz overlooks is the inherent divisiveness of maternal feminism, which seems to ignore those women who are not mothers, either by choice or circumstances. While most women marry and raise children, there are women who remain single by choice and also because of circumstances. One role common to all women is being a daughter, a suggestion made by Victorian feminists in their critique of J.S. Mill and one worthy of reconsideration in this context. The argument that women are different should not be stressed to the point of it becoming vacuous and divisive. In reality, Dietz's conception is similar to that of Elshtain, though "Elshtain speaks of women's moral insights Dietz speaks of feminists' political practices (Squires 1999: 178–179).

Chantal Mouffe, like Dietz agrees on the need to replace the liberal male conception of citizenship with a radical democratic conception of citizenship which would entail the rejection of the notion of **gender-differentiated citizenship**. She argues that sexual difference is a product of particular social discourses and finds no reason as to why all social discourses should draw distinctions of sexual identity. She favours a citizenship in which sexual difference is non-pertinent (1992: 376). Neither gendered nor gender neutral, her conception of citizenship is based on real equality and liberty for all citizens. She stresses on political issues and claims, and observes that the public-private distinction needs to be redefined from case to case, according to the type of political demands, and not in a fixed and permanent way.

To Marshall's three-tier citizenship rights, has been added a fourth one, namely environmental rights which are labelled as third generation rights. The first being tier of rights are civil and political and the second tier are social

and economic rights. Environmental citizenship refers to quality of life which stands threatened by air, water and noise pollution, meteorological disasters like global warming and depletion of ozone layer, climatic change, industrial and population increase and its effect on resource-use.

CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION

Ever since Aristotle, the problem of reconciling the good man with the good citizen has been a recurring theme in political thought. Aristotle contends that while the qualities of a good man are universal and constant, the qualities of a good citizen depend on the constitution under which a citizen lives. He considers three qualities as necessary for a good citizen—loyalty to the established constitution, high degree of capacity for the duties of the office and quality of goodness and justice. For instance, in an oligarchy, a citizen has to preserve the dominance of the ruling wealthy class, while in a democracy a citizen upholds political and economic equality. Only under special circumstances is there an identity between the good man and the good citizen.

Aristotle, following **Plato**, pleads for responsible and effective forms of education for citizenship. This, they consider as a cure for corruption and political instability of their times. They are equally critical of the casual manner in which the Athenian State regarded the tasks of citizenship, which stood in sharp contrast to the disciplined citizenry of Sparta. As a corrective measure, both prescribe state-managed and state-controlled education, as practiced in Sparta. In the *Laws*, Plato makes it clear that the guardian of laws controls the educational system by selecting teachers only from among those who are willing to teach about the laws and traditions of the state in a manner determined by the Guardians. Both Plato and Aristotle 'believed that different styles of civic education should be used for different purposes. Plato emphasised training in self-sacrifice for rulers and obedience for the ruled; Aristotle emphasised the need to match the educational objectives to the form of government' (Heater 1990: 7).

Rousseau perceives the problem in the same manner as Aristotle and recommends the need to educate the man rather than educate the citizen. From Locke onwards, English political thinkers emphasise the importance of public opinion. Hume agrees that good citizenship requires education and knowledge. The citizen needs not merely a general education but specifically a political education that involves 'knowing how' and 'knowing what' with regard to the principles of justice. Aristotle, Rousseau and Hume point out that the citizen will need knowledge of the attitudes and the expectations of fellow citizens. He must learn to adjust with others and win their esteem. Both Aristotle and Rousseau emphasise on the fact that a citizen must learn to rule and to be ruled. This has become a constant theme in democratic thought.

J.S. Mill and **Tocqueville** reiterate Rousseau's stress on political knowledge and observe that participation in local government, voluntary

association and jury service and management of one's work is also a form of education in how to make decisions. However, they differ from Rousseau in stressing the importance of plurality of life's experiments as that enhances freedom, creativity and independence. Mill accepts, what Aristotle had recognised, that the many could become effective citizens and surpass the experts only when their separate sources of knowledge 'meet together'. Oakeshott discusses extensively the importance of political education as that involves learning the political traditions and customs of one's country.

DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP³

It is recognised that unitary citizenship normally integrates diverse groups through a shared identity, the most important development as Marshall observes of one person, one vote. However, despite common citizenship rights, some groups, like African-American, indigenous people, ethnic and religious minorities and women, feel excluded. Differentiated citizenship requires mechanisms of group representation. Women as a social group, according to Young, face four of the five types of oppression (exploitation, powerlessness, cultural, imperialism and violence) and therefore require group representation. As a remedy, cultural pluralists propose that citizenship must reflect their distinct and different social and cultural identity. Young (1989) observes that these marginalised groups can be fully integrated through 'differentiated citizenship', that is the members of certain groups shall be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through the group. That is, their rights shall depend, in part, to their group membership. This view challenges the conventional perception of defining citizenship in terms of treating people as individuals with equal rights under law.

It is important to distinguish between the two broad types of differentiated citizenship. There are groups like the poor, women, ethnic minorities and immigrants whose demand for group rights is a demand for greater inclusion and participation in the mainstream society. They may feel underrepresented in the political process due to historical reasons and therefore seek group-based representation. Or, they may seek exemption from laws that disadvantage them economically or they want school curriculum to recognise their contributions to society's culture and history. These groups accept the goal of national integration, for they desire to be part of the mainstream society as full and equal members but only insist that recognition and accommodation of their difference is needed to bring about national integration. The other group that seeks differentiated citizenship rejects the goal of national integration. They wish to be self-governing, to freely develop their culture and are usually national minorities or distinct historical communities occupying their own territory with a distinct language and history. They do not want greater representation in the central government but transfer of power from the central government to their communities, often through some kind of federalism or local autonomy.

They do not desire greater inclusion into the larger society but autonomy from it. However, this is primarily related to the issues of self-determination rather than citizenship. The latter is based on the expression of a common for each individual. Marion Young (1998: 401) accuses both the liberal and civic republican tradition of espousing 'an ideal of universal citizenship' and excludes groups that undermine the unity of the polity (ibid: 404–405). Modern citizenship emphasises homogeneity and universality and that relegates differences to the private sphere. She defends a conception of differentiated citizenship one that understands not only the different needs and interests but also the different values and modes of expression. 'Each social group affirms the presence of the others and affirms the specificity of its experience and perspective on social issues' (ibid: 416–417).⁴

CONCLUSION

Citizenship focussing on certain common features of rough parity and identity like nationalism is of recent origin, making a beginning with the end of feudalism and completing the process with the emergence of the welfare state after the Second World War in Western Europe. Marshall portrays this sketch of citizenship at the inception of the welfare state with a favourable endorsement and clear approval within a liberal-social democratic paradigm. However, what makes him a seminal theorist is his acknowledgement of a permanent conflict between citizenship and the market, which has been reflected by the upsurge of New Right in, both the United States and Britain, questioning the entire thesis of social citizenship. The essential local basis of citizenship rights within the nation-states has also come under severe criticism because of globalisation and triumph of world capitalism. This has brought to the fore the questions of productivity, competitiveness, order and efficiency, relegating the issue of citizenship to the background. However, the post-Cold War resurgence in emphasising the centrality of social and economic issues have indirectly made citizenship rights as a prime concern of contemporary political theory. The difference between the citizenship rights discourse of yester years and now, is that, like other issues of political theory, it has assumed a global connotation and a modern theory of citizenship can be viable only if it deals with the primary rights of a world citizen.